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Volume 37 Winter 1972 Number 1
CONGRESS AND THE WAR POWERS
THOMAS F. EAGLETON*
On almost every issue, our current national soul-searching leads us
back to one crucial question whose answer is increasingly in doubt: Can
the institutions created almost 200 years ago to govern a rural and agri-
cultural nation meet the need of an urban, twentieth-century, technological
society?
Much of the turmoil and questioning has sprung from our Vietnam
experience. Even today, as we poke through the historical debris of the
Vietnam era, it is. difficult to identify why, and by what authority, the
decisions were made which so deeply committed us in Southeast Asia. And
the most significant question for the future to emerge from our Vietnam
era is this: Who decides when and where America goes to war?
The President claims inherent rights as Commander-in-Chief. Congress
claims that the Executive has usurped its war-making authority. Although
it has the means, to reclaim its authority, Congress has failed to act. In
the past, both Legislature and Executive have been unwilling to have a
showdown on this delicate issue in times of peace, and unable to in times
of war. Yet this debate goes to the very heart of our system of government.
It raises basic questions that must be answered. Will checks and balances
still work in a hair-trigger nuclear age? Have we given up the benefits
of collective judgment out of necessity or out of neglect? What follows is
an effort to set forth the present state of the question and to argue that
an orderly balance of power in war-making matters can and must be
restored.
I. THE CONsTrTUTION AND 11S UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES
During the debate on Indochina, the 91st Congress saw an unprece-
dented outpouring of commentary on the meaning of the Constitution
and the thinking of the men who wrote it. Learned articles have appeared
"United States Senator from Missouri; B.A., Amherst College 1950 (cum
laude); LL.B., Harvard Law School 1953 (cum laude).
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in many of our law reviews.' Law books were searched for both ancient
and modern judicial opinions.2 Treatises of recognized constitutional
scholars were read and reread, and members of Congresss renewed their
own acquaintance with the writings of Hamilton, Madison, Jay and Jef-
ferson 4-all in an attempt to understand the directives of the Constitution
on the way we go to war. But to comprehend these- directives some 183
years after they were written, it is necessary first to distill the principles
on which the Constitution rests.
It is clear that the men who wrote the Constitution were influenced
not only by the writing of theoreticians like Locke and Montesquieu,
but also by the governmental practices and procedures which were followed
or, in some instances, merely preached, in England. They noted on numer-
ous occasions that many of their ideas had been derived "from- the nation
from whom the inhabitants of these states have in general sprung."5
In formulating a Constitution to create a central government of
enormous but not unlimited powers, our Founding Fathers therefore
worked from certain basic premises. First, since all of them were familiar
with the autocratic powers which had been exercised over the colonies by
the King of England, the Founding Fathers were reluctant to grant too
much authority to the Chief Executive. They did not want this country's
President to possess a variety of powers in the absence of any collective
judgment. But neither did they want him completely stripped of dis-
cretion, at the mercy of other branches of the central government. So they
limited his discretionary powers within rather narrow guidelines subject
to legislative check lest the wisdom of a single man-or lack thereof-carry
this country too far. down a selected path.
Second, as a corollary to this concern, the Founding Fathers believed
that the legislature should possess the widest range of authority delegated
to the central government.* A bicameral Congress composed of diverse
individuals would reach its decisions through a process of deliberation and
thus provide a collective judgment. It was not without forethought that
Hamilton conceded "the superior weight and influence of the legislative
body in a free government .... -6 The framers of the Constitution rested
their primary hopes for thoughtful policymaking on Congress, with its most
cumbersome and 'therefore deliberative decision-making process. Congress
1. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 8737 (daily ed. June 10, 1970) where Senator
Church made reference to the article Congress, the President, and the Power to
Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1771 (1968).
2. See, e.g., -Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 36 (1800); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d
302 (2d Cir. 1970).
3. See, e.g., the excellent analysis- of Senator William Spong, Can Balance
Be Restored in the Constitutional War Powers of the President and Congress?,
6 U. RiCH. L. Rv. 1 (1971).
4. E.g., THE FEDERALIsr (A. Hamilton, J. Madison, J. Jay).
5. TIH FEDERALisT No. 26 at 214 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
6. THE FEDERALiST No. 73, at 470 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
(Vol. 37
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received not only the longest list of powers, but also the residuary au-
thority:
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carry-
ing into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof.7
Third, the framers of the Constitution were aware that, by giving
specific and residual powers to the Congress while providing the President
with a somewhat undefined charter, they had created a system of con-
current authority. They did not doubt that in so doing they had sowed the
seeds for possible conflict. It was assumed that if this conflict occurred,
compromise should be sought at all costs. However, if inter-institutional
negotiations proved fruitless, it was likewise dear that overriding control
would remain with the Congress. It was Hamilton-the chief architect of
executive branch power--who wrote:
The legislature is still free to perform its duties, according to its
own sense of them; though the executive, in the exercise of its con-
stitutional powers, may establish an antecedent state of things,
which ought to weigh in the legislative decisions.8
A Congress moving to reverse the policies of a President should step
carefully, but-step it could. Collective decision-making-under the Con-
stitution-was to be given more weight than one mans judgment. Ante-
cedent presidential action could be overruled by the collective will of the
legislature.
II. APPLICATION OF BASIC PRINCIPLES TO THE WAR-MAIUNG PoWER
Obviously the consequences of applying these underlying principles
appear throughout the Constitution. But nowhere are they more evident
than in the treatment given to the war-making powers. The framers of
the Constitution directed a great deal of time and attention to the process
by which this country- should engage in hostilities. While most issues are
dealt with by the Constitution in one reference, the question of waging
war and raising military forces is treated throughout that document:
Article I, section 3 gives the Congress power to "declare war," grant
"Letters of Marque," order "Reprisals," "raise and support Armies" (but
for no longer than two years at a time), "provide and maintain a Navy,"
make rules which will regulate and govern the military forces, and provide
for organizing the militia and calling it up so that insurrections can be
suppressed and invasions repelled.
Article I, section 10 forbids the States-absent congressional consent-
from keeping military forces in time of peace or from engaging "in War,
7. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8.
8. 7 Womxs oF ALEXANDER HAMiLTON 83 (J. Hamilton ed. 1851).
1972]
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unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit
delay."
Article II, section 2 makes the President "Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces as well as the State Militia, when it is called into service for
use by the federal government."
Article IV, section 4 provides that the central government shall guar-
antee "a Republican Form of Government" to every state and "shall pro-
tect each of them against invasion."
These provisions were not designed to provide definitive answers to
all questions regarding the use of American troops or the- appropriate re-
sponses to acts of 'war or hostility by foreign nations. Rather, they were
structured so that the Congress, the Chief Executive, and the States might
understand how they were to mesh their roles in protecting this Nation
from external harm.
In short, the Constitution attempted to assure that the awesome con-
sequences of war did not flow through chance or mistake. The Founding
Fathers set basic ground rules to control what they euphemistically re-
ferred to as "the Dog of War."9 The ground rules themselves were relatively
simple.
First, the framers drew a crucial distinction between offensive and de-
fensive hostilities. If the United States were attacked, the President would
act to repel the attack. Congress could provide the President with a small
standing Army and Navy to fulfill his functions as defender of the nation's
integrity-although in the early years of our nation such a course was ad-
mittedly frowned upon. The states could maintain militia and Congress
could establish procedures under which the President might nationalize
them rapidly to meet foreign attacks.
Second, Congress was to decide whether defensive action was to be
supplemented or replaced by offensive action. The time lost in this process
was considered less important than the necessity that the nation's elected
representatives express their collective judgment. Thus, the Congress was
to sanction in advance whatever actions were taken, whether simple re-
prisals, complex military operations or all-out war.
Third, the President's only role in the war-making process was to direct
operations. That Congress was to play no part in day-to-day tactics was
made clear by the draftsmen of the Constitution who changed the term
"make war"-which might imply the idea of Congress conducting hostilities,
to "declare war"-which carried the connotation of congressional initiation
but presidential direction.10
The exact role of the President as Commander-in-Chief was clarified
both by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention and by the authors
9. 15 THE PAPERS or THOMAS JEFFERSON 397 (J. Boyd ed. 1955).
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of The Federalist. The records make dear the delegates' surprise when the
possibility of giving the President power to make decisions which might
result in offensive military action was raised at the Constitutional Con-
vention. One delegate commented that he "never expected to hear in a
republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.""1 This
statement simply reflected the sentiment that centralized decision-making
on matters of consequence was to be avoided. As Hamilton noted in a
slightly different context:
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted
opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation
to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those
which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the
sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would
be a President of the United States.12
Clearly, the title "Commander-in-Chief" did not carry with it war-initiating
powers and, in the words of The Federalist, No. 69, to be Commander-in-
Chief
would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and
direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and ad-
miral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends
to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets
and armies,-all which, by the Constitution under consideration,
would appertain to the legislature. 13
While the President's role as policy-maker on questions of war was
minimized, he was in turn granted far greater authority in day-to-day mili-
tary affairs once hostilities had been commenced. As Hamilton stated:
The direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities
which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The di-
rection of war implies the direction of the common strength; and
the power of directing and employing the common strength, forms
a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive
authority.14
Fourth, commencement of hostilities was not intended to end con-
gressional responsibility. For although Congress was not to be involved in
making particular tactical decisions, it still was to play an important role
in policymaking. A change from defensive to offensive action would need
legislative approval. Decisions involving major changes in tactics-changes
which might bring new opponents into a war, for example-also would
constitute an appropriate subject for congressional concern.
11. 2-M. FARRArW, TnE REcoRws or THE FEDERAL CONVENTION oF 1787, at 818
(rev. ed. 1937).
12. THE FEDERALisT No. 75, at 477 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
13. THE FEDEP-aLIsr No. 69, at 446 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
14. THE FEDE..isr No. 74, at 478 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
1972]
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That Congress could authorize less than total war was recognized by
all three branches of the federal government early in our history. The early
application of the Constitution's provisions dealing with war-making and
the use of American military forces takes on special significance since
most of the decisions and writings were the product of men who had either
participated in drafting the Constitution or were intimately familiar with
the context of its provisions.
In 1798, due to a number of French actions against American shipping,
the United States became embroiled in its first trial by arms. Refusing
to take independent action to initiate hostilities with the French, Presi-
dent John Adams waited until the Congress had passed a variety of stat-
utes15 suspending commercial relations with France and authorizing Amer-
ican vessels to seize certain French ships as well as other ships trading with
the French. Thus, it was Congress which originated and limited our first
combat response to hostile action by a foreign power.
This naval struggle with France produced, in turn, a series of judicial
decisions by our Supreme Court which illuminated the principles under-
lying the Constitution's war-making provisions. In Bas v. Tingy,16 the
Court held that Congress could declare war in either of two ways-as a
public or perfect war or as a limited or imperfect war. Justice Washington
stated:
If it be declared in form, it is called solemn, and is of the perfect
kind; because one whole nation is at war with another whole
nation, and all the members of the nation declaring war, are
authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of the
other, in every place, and under every circumstance. In such a
war all the members act under a general authority, and all the
rights and consequences of war attach to their condition.
But hostilities may subsist between two nations, more confined
in its nature and extent being limited as to places, persons, and
things; and this is more properly termed imperfect war, because not
solemn, and because those who are authorized to commit hostilities,
act under special authority, and can go no farther than to the
extent of their commission. Still, however, it is public war, because
it is an external contention by force between some of the members
of the two nations, authorized by the legitimate powers. It is a war
between the two nations, though all the members are not author-
ized to commit hostilities such as in a solemn war, where the gov-
ernment restrain the general power.17
The limited naval actions of 1798, according to Justice Washington, con-
stituted "war of the imperfect kind, . . . more properly called acts of
15. Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578; Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 48, 1 Stat.561.
16. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
17. Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 37
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hostility or reprisal" and were well within the constitutional power of
Congress to declare.18 Justice Chase, concurring, stated that Congress had
taken the permissible route of declaring "hostilities... by certain persons
in certain cases." He noted further that such deliberate action "only proves
the circumspection and prudence of the legislature."' 9
Justice Patterson, concurring in this unanimous sanctioning of Con-
gress' power to declare a war limited in time or scope or area, stated:
As far as congress tolerated and authorized the war on our part,
so far may we proceed in hostile operations .... [It] is, there-
fore, a public war between the two nations qualified, on our part,
in the manner prescribed by the constitutional organ of our
country.20
As the Bas case should be interpreted as delineating the range of con-
gressional powers to declare and circumscribe hostilities, Talbot v. See-
man2l should be read as putting the Court on record as to which branch
of government must bear the sole responsibility for taking this country
into hostilities-whether limited or full scale. It was newly appointed Chief
justice John Marshall who wrote:
The whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United
States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be re-
sorted to as our guides in this inquiry. It is not denied, nor, in the
course of the argument has it been denied, that congress may au-
thorize general hostilities, in which case the general laws of war
apply to our situation; or partial hostilities, in which case the laws
of war, so far as they actually apply to our situation, must be
noticed.2 2
Three years later, in Little v. Barreme,23 Marshall expounded further
on the constitutional structuring of the war-making powers. In 1799 Con-
gress had authorized the seizure of American ships bound for French ports.
The Little case involved the seizure of a vessel which had been taken enroute
from a French port to the Danish Island of St. Thomas. In a short opinion,
Marshall ruled that the seizure was in conflict with the congressional
will and .therefore illegal. The Chief Justice stressed that had Congress
simply declared a naval war against the French, the President as "Com-
mander-in-Chief of the armies and navies . . .might, without any special
authority for that purpose" have had power to seize an American ship
bound from France.2 4 By sanctioning only the seizure of American ships
18. Id.
19. Id. at 43-45.
20. Id. at 45-46.
21. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
22. Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
23. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
24. Id. at 177.
1972]
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to France, Congress had effectively pre-empted presidential discretion and
"prescribed that the manner in which this law shall be carried into execu-
tion... exclude[s] a seizure of any vessel not bound to a French port."2 5
Thus, through these three early decisions, the Supreme Court set forth
a solid underpinning for later interpretations of the war-making powers.
To the Court, "[t]he whole powers" of entering into an offensive war
were vested in the Congress "alone." 26 Included in these powers was au-
thority to declare either general or narrowly limited hostilities. Presidential
authority to take offensive action under the guise of the Commander-in-
Chief power arose only after Congress had acted. Moreover, while the
tactics of warfare might require that the President have *certain discre-
tionary powers, even these powers could be narrowed by precedent legisla-
tive action. 27
This interpretation of the constitutionally prescribed dichotomy regard-
ing the war-making powers was not held by the High Court, alone. Such
diverse personalities as Jefferson, Hamilton, Adams, and Madison all
agreed that presidential authority to take offensive action as Commander-
in-Chief existed only after Congress had acted, and even then these powers
could be narrowed by precedent legislative action. But they realized that
strong-willed Presidents, exercising their commander-in-chief powers, might
show great reluctance in returning to Congress for further approval of
new decisions once hostilities had begun. Powerful presidents would natu-
rally interpret policy decisions to be tactical. The Founding Fathers
responded to this dilemma by giving the Congress full .power over the
expenditure of funds for the military and insisting that such funds be
reviewed at least every two years. As The Federalist No. 24 noted:
The whole power of raising armies was lodged in the Legisla-
ture . . . [subject to] an important qualification . . . which for-
bids the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any
longer period than two years-a precaution which, upon a nearer
view of it, will appear to be a great and real security against the
keeping up of troops without evident necessity.23
The Founding Fathers hoped that Congress would not turn on the
Commander-in-Chief once hostilities had begun and force him to alter
his course. But they recalled that such action had been taken by English
Parliaments against wilful kings29 and, as unpleasant as the prospect was,
25. Id. at 177-78.
26. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1, 28 (1801).
27. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 204 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton.)
29. By 1789, in England, Parliament was the dominant force in military af-
fairs. In fact, it had been so since the early years of the seventeenth century; no
king had been able to wage a war without parliamentary consent since 1626. In
that year, when Charles I tried to wage a war without parliamentary consent, Parlia-
ment voted him no money. The impossibility of continuing the war without
[Vol. 37
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they recognized that similar action might be required by Congresses faced
with strong and militant Presidents.
III. THE PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE
The set language of the Constitution and its underlying principles
have been subjected to 183 years of practice. Unfortunately precedents
have occurred which prevent a conclusive argument that these principles
are still in effect.
In recent congressional debate much was made of the fact that at
least 125 instances can be cited where Presidents have sent military units
into hostilities at their own discretion.30 Most of these actions have been
relatively trivial, some having the post facto sanction of Congress: rescu-
ing American citizens abroad in times of disorder or revolution, protecting
commerce against piracy, and other miscellaneous policing operations such
as the Boxer Rebellion in China. But some of these cases must be viewed
as dear abuses of executive power. One such abuse occurred when Presi-
dent Polk sent American troops to occupy the disputed border territory
with Mexico, provoking a dash in which 11 Americans were killed. How-
ever, Polk's action was not unnoticed and by a vote of 85-81 the House
of Representatives denounced it as a war unnecessarily and unconstitu-
tionally begun by the President of the United States. 31
With a few exceptions, however, the constitutional separation of
powers remained pretty much intact until the turn of the century. In
the 20th century the President's war-making powers rapidly expanded
with Teddy Roosevelt's intervention in Panama and Wilson's excursions
into Mexico.
President Franklin Roosevelt took extraordinary powers upon him-
self as he prepared for World War II. First, he conveyed 50 destroyers
to England, under his powers as Commander-in-Chief. Then, through
convoys to England and a shoot-on-sight doctrine, Roosevelt in effect
committed the United States to war with Germany.
During the war the President expanded his powers even further when
opposing certain measures of the Emergency Price Control Act as infla-
tionary. He threatened the Congress bluntly when he declared:
In the event that the Congress should fail to act, and act ade-
quately, I shall accept the responsibility, and I will act.
At the same time that fair prices are stabilized, wages can and
will be stabilized also. This I will do.
parliamentary financing led Charles to sign the Petition of Right (1628) which de-
dared it illegal to collect any taxes without parliamentary consent, thus ending
forever the possibility of a king waging wars independent of parliamentary au-
thorization.
30. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REc. 5640-46 (daily ed. April 26, 1971) (remarks of
Senator Goldwater).
31. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1848).
1972.]
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The President has the powers, under the Constitution and under
Congressional acts, to take measures necessary to avert a disaster
which would interfere with the winning of the war ....
When the war is won, the powers under which I act automatically
revert to the people-to whom they belong. 2
If a President can put us into war and then successfully claim un-
limited presidential power in wartime it could easily provide a precedent
for the destruction of our constitutional government.
At the end of World War II public opinion strongly favored collec-
tive security-a concert of great powers enforcing peace by joint action
against any future Hitler through the Charter of the United Nations.
But Congress by no means relinquished its war power by consenting to
ratify the United Nations Charter. Several weeks after the United Nations
Charter became operative the United Nations Participations Act was
passed by the Congress. Section 6 of that act empowered the President
to negotiate a military agreement or agreements with the United Nations
Security Council to make American forces available for United Nations'
peace-keeping purposes. This was no blank check, however, for such agree-
ments were "subject to the approval of Congress by appropriate Act or
joint resolution." 33 The Participation Act also stated:
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as an authorization to
the President by the Congress to make available to the Security
Council . . . armed forces, facilities, or assistance in addition to
the forces, facilities and assistance provided for in such special
agreement or agreements. 34
Only once have American armed forces been committed to full-scale
combat on the basis of a decision made unilaterally by the President. That
instance was Korea.
Although emergency conditions clearly existed after the North Korean
invasion of South Korea, and the United Nations Security Council passed
an "authorizing resolution" after United States air and naval forces were
committed,35 President Truman's action must be viewed as a sharp in-
cursion into congressional war-initiating power. Congress never delegated
power to the Security Council to commit American soldiers to hostilities
under the United Nations Charter. Congressional leaders were informed
"on the events and decisions of the past few days" but not asked to assent
32. See generally E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWES 304 (3d
ed. 1948).
33. United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287 (d) (1970).
34. Id.
35. See Hoyt, The United States Reaction to the Korean Attack: A Study
of the Principles of the United Nations Charter as a Factor in American Policy
Making, 55 AM. J. INT'l L. 45 (1961).
("Vol. 37
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to those decisions. 36 However noble the motivation, this stands as a solitary
case in our history, and it represents a precedent which must never happen
again.
President Truman declared, through the Department of State Bul-
letin, that "[tlhe President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of
the United States, has full control over the use thereof."3 7 The Bulletin
went on to claim a "traditional power of the President to use the armed
forces of the United States without consulting Congress." 38 Obviously,
this was a bold claim to "inherent" or "traditional" presidential power-
which undermines the whole concept of constitutional government through
a written Constitution.
Whereas President Eisenhower tended to acquiesce to the consti-
tutional powers of Congress, John Kennedy tended to take the broadest
of all possible views regarding presidential powers. On the eve of the
Cuban crisis, President Kennedy sent to Congress a draft resolution stating
that "the President of the United States is supported in his determina-
tion and possesses all necessary authority" to act.39 According to the Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief, this authority encompassed the use
of the armed forces of the United States
to prevent the Castro regime from "exporting its aggressive pur-
poses" to any part of the hemisphere. . and to prevent the crea-
tion or use of any "externally supported offensive military base"
in Cuba.40
Congress balked. Senator Richard Russell and others would not stand
for such a resolution. In Russell's words, it was "a clear delegation of
the Congressional power to declare war."41 Senator Russell concluded:
I feel very strongly it is preferable to say he was authorized (by
Congress) instead of that he possesses all the necessary authority.4 2
In its final form, the resolution did not confer authority on the President,
but rather served simply as a statement of national policy.43
36. President Truman ordered American air and sea forces to give Korean
Government troops cover and support on June 26, 1950. The President sent a mes-
sage to Congress on July 19, 1950: The Korean Situation: Its Significance to the
People of the United States, 23 DEP'T STATE BULL. 163 (1950).
37. U.S. Dept of State, Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in
Korea, 23 DP'T STATE BULL. 173 (1950).
38. Id. at 174.
39. S. Con. Res. 92, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 108 CONG. REc. 19,528 (1962).
40. id.
41. Hearings on S. Con. Res. 92 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions and the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1962).
42. Id. at 36.
43. Cuban Resolution, Pub. L. No. 87-733, 76 Stat. 697 (1962).
1972]
11
Eagleton: Eagleton: Congress and the War
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
IV. THE WAR IN INDOCHINA AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTIONS WHICH SURROUND IT
An account of this country's war-making efforts obviously cannot be
complete without including the present hostilities in Indochina. No war
in our history has troubled the nation more, and no war has posed more
difficult constitutional questions.
United States' military involvement in Indochina dates back to 1955,
when President Eisenhower established a military advisory group of
approximately 350 persons in South Vietnam, although almost one billion
dollars in aid had been accorded the French since 1950. By the time Eisen-
hower left office, the United States' military group had more than doubled.
Under President Kennedy, the number of American military advisors in
South Vietnam continued to grow steadily. At the time of President Ken-
nedy's death in 1963, the American commitment to that country had
grown to 18,000 men, and their functions had broadened. They trained
South Vietnamese troops and coordinated their military activities as well.
They accompanied local forces on forays and advised them how to fight
the Viet Cong. While these various American quasi-military activities were
never kept secret, neither were they put before Congress for its specific
approval.
Congress did not really seem to mind this arguable incursion into
its powers and, in fact, continued to appropriate monies to support these
actions in Vietnam. After all, the conflict was not going too badly. It
was not inordinately expensive, and, in line with the new Kennedy doc-
trine of "flexible response," it constituted our first experiment in limited
war-making and in the training of foreign forces to participate in the
worldwide struggle against international communism.
Unfortunately for military strategists, amateur counter-revolutionaries,
and quiescent politicians, increasing communist activity and the coming
1964 presidential elections made Vietnam a front-page story. Then came
the Gulf of Tonkin. In August 1964, American warships were allegedly
attacked on two separate occasions by North Vietnamese patrol boats.
After the second alleged attack, President Johnson ordered air strikes
against North Vietnam's mainland-aimed at knocking out not only patrol
boats, but also naval bases and petroleum storage depots as well. These
were reprisals neither proportionate to, nor fully justified by, the attacks
which were alleged to have occurred. 44 Again, Congress was not consulted
before the response, and again Congress took very little note of this in-
cursion into its constitutional powers.
On the following day, however, the President did present Congress
with certain facts regarding the Tokin Gulf incident. He asked both Houses
44. See generally the material referring to the Gulf of Tonkin incident in the
chapter Military Pressures Against North Vietnam, in 4 U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENsE,
UNITED STATEs-VIrNAm RELATIONS 1945-1967 (Comm. Print 1971);
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for their complete support through passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
Both Houses responded rapidly and passed this vaguely worded and ill-
defined resolution in its original presidential form with only two dissenting
votes-Senators Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening.45
In perhaps his finest hour, Senator Morse attempted to persuade
Congress that it must not grant the President this broad "predated declara-
tion of war." The resolution stated (in part):
[T]he Congress approves and supports the determination of
the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary meas-
ures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United
States and to prevent further aggression.
The United States regards as vital to its national interest and
to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security
in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution and the Charter
of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is,
therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all neces-
sary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or
protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty re-
questing assistance in defense of its freedom.
This resolution shall expire when. the President shall determine
that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured .... 46
Despite anguished protestations in retrospect, it seems clear that Con-
gress knew what power it was delegating to the President at the time it
passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The record shows not only the warn-
ings of Senators Morse and Gruening, but also a debate containing the
following colloquy between Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee and floor manager for the Resolution, and Senator
Brewster:
Mr. Brewster. I had the opportunity to see warfare not so very
far from this area, and it was very mean. I would look with great
dismay on a situation involving the landing of large land armies
on the continent of Asia. So my question is whether there is any-
thing in the resolution which would authorize or recommend or
approve the landing of large American armies in Vietnam or in
China.
Mr. Fulbright. There is nothing in the resolution, as I read it,
that contemplates it. I agree with the Senator that that is the last
thing we would want to do. However, the language of the resolu-
tion would not prevent it. It would authorize whatever the Com-
45. Vietnam Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964), repealed by
Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12 (Jan. 12, 1971).
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mander in Chief feels is necessary. It does not restrain the Execu-
tive from doing it. Whether or not that should ever be done is a
matter of wisdom under the circumstances that exist at the particu-
lar time it is contemplated. This kind of question should more
properly be addressed to the Chairman of the Armed Services
Committee. Speaking for my own committee, everyone I have heard
has said that the last thing we want to do is to become involved in
a land war in Asia; that our power is sea and air, and that this is
what we hope will deter the Chinese Communists and the North
Vietnamese from spreading the war. That is what is contemplated.
The resolution does not prohibit that, or any other kind of
activity.47
Later that day, Senator Fulbright and Senator John Sherman Cooper
discussed the meaning of the Resolution:
Mr. Cooper: Then, looking ahead, if the President decided that it
was necessary to use such force as could lead into war, we will
give that authority by this resolution?
Mr. Fulbright: That is the way I would interpret it. If a situation
later developed in which we thought the approval should be with-
drawn, it could be withdrawn by concurrent resolution.4 8
It seems certain that in 1964 no member of Congress thought that
within a year American planes would be running daily bomb runs over
North Vietnam, even though the "Pentagon Papers" indicate that plans
had been drafted by the Executive,49 or that thousands of American troops
would be engaged in "search and destroy" missions in South Vietnam's
Delta region or constructing American base camps throughout that coun-
try. Despite his contingency plans President Johnson probably had no
idea that the limited military operation in South Vietnam would soon
blossom into a 30 billion dollar-a-year war.
Faulty vision and political pressures cannot be permitted to minimize
the legal significance of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. In my judgment,
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution-pared of its verbiage and placed in the
context of its legislative history-was a broad congressional charter to the
President to combat North Vietnamese forces anywhere in the SEATO
area. It was an extremely broad delegation of authority in the area of
foreign affairs but, as the Supreme Court noted in Zemel v. Rusk,5o Con-
gress has always been permitted to grant extensive powers in foreign affairs
47. 110 CONG. REc. 18,403-04 (1964) (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 18,409 (emphasis added).
49. The authorization for contingency preparations was published in March,
1964. See generally the chapter Military Pressures Against North Vietnam, in 4
U.S. DEFPT. or DEFENSE, UNITED STATES-VIETNAMi RELATIONs 1945-1967 (Comm.
Print 1971).
50. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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and to "paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in
domestic areas." 5' Although the existence of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution
did not make the war we have waged in South Vietnam any wiser or
any more explicable, it did make it a legitimate war authorized by the
Congress.
This authorization has been revoked by the 91st Congress52-in fact,
the Senate repealed it twice.63 The President agreed, signing the repeal
into law. But the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution has done
nothing to change the course of the war or to reassert congressional au-
thority over it. Indeed, by failing to substitute a new legislative authoriza-
tion to either continue military action or force withdrawal, and by tacitly
accepting the right of the Commander-in-Chief to act in any way he wishes,
Congress has left the scope of its authority in even greater doubt than
before.
In fact, however, neither President Johnson nor President Nixon has
been willing to conduct war-making operations simply on the basis of
the broad authority granted in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Lyndon
Johnson thought the Tonkin Resolution was "desirable" but as he stated
at a press conference on August 18, 1967:
"We stated then, and we repeat now, we did not think the resolu-
tion was necessary to do what we did and what we're doing."5 4
In the 1966 memorandum, the State Department contended that the
SEATO Treaty was self-executing-that the President could independently
commit troops to defend any SEATO signatory or protocol state under
attack from communist forces if he deemed such action advisable. 55 But
51, Id. at 17.
52. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12
(Jan. 12, 1971).
53. The Senate voted to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on June 24,
1970, and reaffirmed that vote on July 10, 1970.
54. New York Times, Aug. 19, 1967, at 10, col. 1.
55. Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of
fiet-nam, 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 474, 484-85 (1966).
Secretary Rusk brought out a "something for everyone" shopping list of Viet-
nam justifications on January 28, 1966, when conceding that the SEATO treaty
was not necessarily self-triggering. He stated:
I would not want to get into the question of whether, if we were
not interested in the commitments, policy and principle under the South-
east Asia Treaty, we have some legal way in order to avoid those commit-
ments. I suppose that one could frame some argument which would make
that case.
But it would seem to us that the policy, which was discussed and
passed upon by the Executive and the Senate of that day, is that we are
opposed to aggression against these countries in southeast Asia: both the
members of the Organization and the protocol states.
In addition to that, we have bilateral assistance agreements to South
Vietnam. We have had several actions of the Congress. We have had the
annual aid appropriations in which the purposes of the aid have been
19721
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the SEATO Treaty-like the NATO Treaty, and all of our other collec-
tive security agreements-states that the United States shall meet aggression
against one of its allies "in accordance with its constitutional processes."56
Even if this caveat were not included in the Treaty, it would be incorpo-
rated implicitly. For the Senate-which is the only House of Congress
that approves a treaty-can hardly by-pass the constitutional requirement
that both Houses of Congress declare war.
Above and beyond the Tonkin Gulf Resolution or any treaty com-
mitments, successive administrations have professed to find, as some of
the predecessors have, inherent powers of the Commander-in-Chief which
have been taken to authorize military action almost anywhere in the
world. In the same 1966 memorandum quoted previously, the Department
of State referred to the constitutional responsibility of the Commander-
in-Chief to "repel sudden attacks." 57 The Department allowed that the
"framers probably had in mind attacks upon the United States," but that
now, in a world grown smaller, "[a]n attack on a country far from our
shores can impinge directly on the nation's security."5 8 Under these con-
ditions, according to the Department's memorandum,
the Constitution leaves to the President the judgment to deter-
mine whether the circumstances of a particular armed attack are
so urgent and the potential consequences so threatening to the se-
curity of the United States that he should act without formally
consulting the Congress. 59
V. THE STATE OF THE ISSUE TODAY
Recently, even more extended presidential powers have been dis-
covered and proclaimed. On July 1, 1970, in an interview with Howard K.
Smith, President Nixon seemed to extend the President's presumed au-
thority to defend American security on a global basis even further-to
winning a "just peace":
fully set out before the Congress. We have had special resolutions such as
the one of August 1964, and we have had the most important policy dec-
larations by successive Presidents with respect to the protection of South
Vietnam against Communist aggression.
Hearings on S. 2793 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1, at 8 (1966).
Congress remains confused. At the end of a colloquy on repeal of the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution between Senator Robert Dole and myself last June, the only thing
that was clear was that the authority under which United States troops have been
engaged and would remain engaged in Vietnam hostilities was unclear. See generally
116 CONG. REc. 18,970-82 (daily ed. June 23, 1970).
56. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Sept. 8, 1954, art. IV, para. 1,
art. IX, para. 2, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170.
57. Meeker, supra note 55, at 484.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 485.
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Mr. Smith. What justification do you have for keeping troops
there other than protecting the troops that are there fighting?
The President. A very significant justification. It isn't just a case
of seeing that the Americans are moved out in an orderly way. If
that were the case we could move them out more quickly, but it
is a case of moving American forces out in a way that we can at
the same time win a just peace. 60
When fighting broke out in Jordan on September 17, 1970, Congress
was in session. Although United States' intervention was a very real possi-
bility, the President did not seek congressional authorization to act. The
State Department, in a letter to me, reaffirmed its broad view of the
President's inherent constitutional powers which would cover United
States' action in Jordan:
As a general matter, the President must determine in a particular
situation what action he believes necessary in behalf of the security
interests of the United States and whether the pressure of events
would permit him to take no action while the matter was sub-
mitted to Congress for its consideration. 61
Somehow, in recent years, powers to ensure a "just peace" and un-
ilaterally to define and protect "the security interests of the United States"
wherever they may be threatened have been grafted to the constitutional
authority of our Presidents as Commanders-in-Chief. If these claims are
accepted, we also accept a major restructuring of the constitutional balance
between Congress and the Executive, leaving Congress in the position of
ratifying hostilities initiated unilaterally by the President or trying to stop
them by cutting off funding, rather than making the precedent decision
to authorize these hostilities.
In my view, both constitutional theory and the practical need for
order at home and in the world require that these broad theories of uni-
lateral presidential authority be rejected. At the very least, the revolutionary
process by which the President has pre-empted Congress' constitutional
duty to initiate war should be debated and either legitimated by constitu-
tional change or rejected.
Some would argue that decades of congressional acquiescence plus
Congress' poor performance during the Vietnam War constitute a persua-
sive case for formally restructuring the Constitution to give the President
a broader, more unilateral war-making authority. I believe to the contrary
that such a formal abdication of congressional authority should be opposed,
as should further erosion of Congress' war-making role. The tragic presi-
dential miscalculations on Vietnam-almost destroying that country while
60. A Conversation With the President, 63 DEF'T STATE BULL. 103-04 (1970).
61. Letter from U.S. Dept of State to Sen. Thomas Eagleton, Oct. 2, 1970.
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seriously dividing this one-are an even more compelling argument for
returning to the principles of collective judgment and deliberation. We
do live in a smaller, more dangerous and rapidly changing world. But
these factors, rather than diminishing the value of collective judgment,
make it all the more important. While "declarations of war" may be
anachronisms, the death, destruction, tragedy, and suffering of war remain
ever-present realities. Congress can and must exercise collective judgment
as to when and how we engage in hostilities.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Congress possesses the power to restore its role in the process of
collective decision making on matters of war and peace, if only it possesses
the will. As constitutional scholar Alexander Bickel has noted:
The "necessary-and-proper" clause of Article I of all the Consti-
tution authorizes Congress, of course, to make "all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the fore-
going Powers . .." The reference is to the previously enumerated
powers of Congress. But there is another portion of the necessary-
and-proper clause, not so often cited, which is one of the greatest
consequence when it comes to issues of foreign policy and of war
and peace. The clause also charges Congress to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."62
In 1970, during the second session of the 91st Congress, the House
passed a feeble Joint Resolution which expressed the sense of Congress
that "whenever feasible," the President should seek appropriate congres-
sional consultations before involving the Armed Forces of the United
States in armed conflict, and should "continue such consultation periodi-
cally during such armed conflict."63 This vaguely worded effort fell far
short of clarifying the war-making powers of the Congress and the Presi-
dent. On the Senate side, no hearings were held on the House Resolution
or on a slightly better bill introduced by Senator Javits of New York.6 4
In general, debate in the Senate has only touched the periphery of the
constitutional questions involved, concentrating instead on the Cooper-
Church and McGovern-Hatfield amendments dealing specifically with
the Indochina War.
In 1971, in the first session of the 92nd Congress, eleven "war powers"
62. Hearings on War Powers Legislation Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 92d Cong., Ist Sess-.(1971).
63. H.RJ. Res. 1355, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1970).
64. S. 5964, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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bills or resolutions were introduced in the House 5 and five in the Sen-
ate.66 Senator Robert Taft of Ohio introduced a resolution 7 which, while
vague as to the future delineation of congressional-Executive powers, was
meritorious in its attempt to force Congress to face up to its responsi-
bilities in Southeast Asia.
Senator Jacob Javits of New York, the first Senator to introduce "war
powers" legislation and a leader in bringing the issue to the attention of
Congress and the public, introduced a slightly improved version 68 of his
original 1970 effort.
The Eagleton Resolution 69 was introduced on March 1, 1971. Senator
John Stennis, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, also introduced
a resolution 70 along the general lines of the Eagleton proposal on May
11th and Senator Bentsen of Texas introduced essentially the Stennis
Resolution in bill form on May 17th.71
Underlying all these efforts was the premise that more precise guide-
lines were necessary to restore the process of joint congressional and presi-
dential decision-making before this country engages in hostilities abroad.72
These efforts recognized that the President must have sufficient discre-
tion to take emergency action to meet attacks on the United States and
its forces and to rescue American civilians under seige abroad.
These measures represented different approaches. After months of
meetings among Senator Javits, Senator Stennis and me, a compromise
bill was agreed upon, which can best be understood against the background
of the five original proposals.
The following table illustrates the areas of agreement and disagree-
ment among the original Senate proposals:
65. H.R. 8446, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 4194, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971); H.R.J. Res. 680, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.J. Res. 669, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971); H.R.J. Res. 665, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.J. Res. 664, 92d
Cong., 1st Ses. (197i); H.R.J. Res. 644, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.J. Res. 431,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.J. Res. 342, 92d Cong., 1st Sem. (1971); H.R.J.
Res. 275, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.J. Res. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
66. S. 1880, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 731, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
S.J. Res. 95, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 59, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
S.J. Res. 18, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
67. S.J. Res. 18, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
68. S. 731, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
69. S.J. Res. 59, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). For the text of this joint resolu-
tion in its entirety, see APPENDIx No. 1.
70. S.J. Res. 95, 92d Cong., 1st $ess. (1971).
71. S. 1880, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
72. Senator Javits stated the guiding principle behind these legislative efforts:
The enumeration of Congressional war powers in the Constitution and
the historical origins of the "declare" and "Commander in Chief" clauses
testify that the constitutional framers intended to grant Congress the
primary authority over the initiation of war and responsibility for the
formulation of basic guidelines for the conduct of war.
117 CONG. REc. 2531 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1971).
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A. Treaties
All of our mutual defense treaties contain the caveat that each of
the signators act "in accordance with their constitutional processes."7 a
In this country, that means a collective decision must be reached by both
Houses of Congress before United States' forces can be committed to trial
by force, not by the President and the Senate through the use of the treaty
power.
It seems clear that the President and the Senate, through the use of
the treaty power, cannot legitimately "declare war." The concurrence of
the House is required to authorize hostilities.7 4 In fact, Madison noted
that the possibility of giving the Senate alone the power to "declare war"
was considered and rejected.7 5
Even if treaties could require the use of armed force, however, none
of our treaties currently in force requires an automatic response. Our
most strongly worded commitment, the North Atlantic Treaty, states:
The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an
armed attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the Party or
Parties so attacked by taking... such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force .... 76
Under this language, the United States is not committed to an im-
mediate or automatic response. As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
told the 81st Congress in its report on the NATO Treaty:
Would the United States be obligated to react to an attack on
Paris or Copenhagen in the same way it would react to an attack
on New York City? In such an event does the treaty give the Presi-
dent the power to take any action without specific Congressional
authorization which he could not take in the absence of the treaty?
The answer to both of these questions is "No. 71
However, after re-reading murky presidential assertions on SEATO,
it seems prudent rather than redundant to spell out that treaties do not
authorize hostilities without further congressional action.
73. See, e.g., Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, supra note 56, art. IV,
para. 1, art. IX, para. 2.
74. Bickel goes one step further in arguing that a delegation that is too broad
may result:
On the other hand, I think that a generalized, prospective delegation by
Congress to the President of the Power to go to war in aid of our allies
pursuant to treaty commitment gives away more of its own power than
Congress may constitutionally give away by so broad a delegation-or at
any rate, a delegation which it is possible to construe all too broadly.
Hearings on War Powers Legislation, supra note 62, at.
75. J. MADISON, supra note 10, at 475.
76. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964.
77. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON Ex. L., NORTH ATLANTIc
TREATY, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1949).
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The Stennis and Bentsen proposals were unclear on this point. The
Taft Resolution dealt with deployment. The Eagleton Resolution specifi-
cally stated:
No treaty previously or hereafter entered into by the United States
shall be construed as authorizing or requiring the Armed Forces of
the United States to engage in hostilities without further Con-
gressional authorization.78
However, the Javits bill not only failed to spell this out but, if enacted
by both Houses, would have served as a functional equivalent of a pre-
dated-although limited-declaration of war. Under it, the Executive could
have unilaterally engaged the United States in hostilities for up to 30
days in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad-Tobago, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thai-
land, the United Kingdom, South Vietnam, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Norway, Greece,
Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, and
Japan-all treaty signatories with the United States.79
All of the Senate initiatives recognized the President's ability to fight
a limited defensive war to protect American forces when they were legally
stationed in a country with which the United States has a treaty commit-
ment.
But what was at issue was whether the President should have unilateral
authority to commit United States' troops to offensive hostilities under our
far-reaching network of treaties. Three early Supreme Court decisions
provide a solid underpinning for drawing the line between offensive and
defensive war.8 0
78. S.J. Res. 59, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
79. The following are the signatory countries to the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad-Tobago, Uraguay, and Venezuela. The following are the
signatory countries to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, supra note 56:
Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the
United Kingdom. South Vietnam was designated a protocol state to the SEATO
agreement. The following are the signatory countries to the North Atlantic Treaty,
Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
A complete explanation of the commitments of the United States to the de-
fense of foreign countries may be found in U.S. Dep't. of State, United States De-
fense Commitment and Assurances, August, 1967, in Hearings on S. Res. 151 Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-71 (1967).
80. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Talbot v. Seeman, 5
U.S. ( Cranch) 1 (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). To the Court
"the whole powers" of entering into an offensive war were vested in the Congress
[Vol. 37
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B. Pre-emptive Strikes
Should the President be empowered to strike first if he deems the
very existence of this country to be threatened by "imminent" nuclear
attack?
The concept of executive power to act pre-emptively is not new. In
fact, the Articles of Confederation contained the first and only explicit
grant of power for a pre-emptive strike:
No state shall engage in any war without the consent of the United
States in Congress assembled, unless such state be actually invaded
by enemies, or shall have received certain advice of a resolution
being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such state, and
the danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay, till the
United States in Congress assembled can be consulted.81
However, a similar provision was omitted from the Constitution.
Justice Story again raised the possibility of executive pre-emptive powers
when he stated:
the power to provide for repelling invasions includes the power
to provide against the attempt and danger of invasion, as the neces-
sary and proper means to effectuate the object. One of the best
means to repel invasion is to provide the requisite force for action
before the invader himself has reached the soil.82
In the nuclear world of 1972, the stakes are no longer isolated villages
subject to attack by Indians. In a sane world dependent on the universal
acceptance of mutual deterrence for its survival, a first strike should not
be sanctioned. But no one can guarantee that some time, someday, a de-
mented world leader will not attempt an irrational nuclear attack on the
United States. This remote possibility may be reason enough to justify
an explicit grant of power to the President to act unilaterally and pre-
emptively.
The Taft, Stennis and Bentsen efforts sanctioned unilateral presi-
dential action to prevent an "imminent" nuclear attack.83 The Eagleton
and Javits proposals did not. Perhaps, as Congress attempts to clearly define
the war powers of the executive and legislative branches, it should also
"alone." Included in these powers was authority to declare either general or nar-
rowly limited hostilities. Presidential authority to take offensive action under the
guise of the Commander-in-Chief power arose only after Congress had acted. Talbot
v. Seeman, supra at 27. Moreover, while the tactics of warfare might require that
the President have certain discretionary powers, even these could be narrowed by
precedent legislative action. Little v. Barreme, supra at 177-78.
81. ARTicLs OF CONFEDERATION art. VI.
82. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
83. S.J. Res. 18, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971); S.J. Res. 95, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1971); S. 1880, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
1972]
23
Eagleton: Eagleton: Congress and the War
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
recognize that, in the final analysis, all any resolution can expect to achieve
is to hold a President legally and politically accountable for his actions.
But the consequences of nuclear holocaust make the questions of political
and legal responsibility moot.
C. When Congress Must Act
In what circumstances and at what point must the President come to
Congress for authorization to conduct military hostilities? Should the con-
tinuance of a secret air war or the deployment of American troops to world
hot spots, or the assignment of American "advisors" to foreign troops on
combat missions require affirmative congressional authorization?
The Eagleton, Stennis and Bentsen proposals specified when affirma-
tive congressional action was necessary.84 The Javits and Taft Resolutions
contained no such provisions. Obviously, hostilities include land, air, or
naval action taken by the Armed Forces of the United States against other
armed forces or the civilian population of any other nation. But the
Eagleton, Stennis and Bentsen efforts were more specific. They included
the deployment of American forces outside the United States under cir-
cumstances where an imminent involvement in combat activities was a
reasonable possibility. They also included the assignment of United
States' soldiers to "accompany, command, coordinate, or participate in the
movement of regular or irregular armed forces of any foreign country when
such foreign armed forces are engaged in any form of combat activity."8 5
There is well-founded precedent for such limitations. In the absence
of limiting congressional legislation, presidential power to move Armed
Forces of the United States in international waters and to station them on
territory of our allies has generally been accepted, except where such action
could reasonably be expected to lead to hostilities. Only once has this
principle been flagrantly abused. In 1846, after the annexation of Texas,
President James Polk ordered American troops to enter the disputed terri-
tory between the Nueces and Rio Grande Rivers. Hostilities immediately
broke out and Congress thereafter declared war against Mexico. However,
some 18 months later, the House of Representatives concluded that the
President had unconstitutionally begun the war and, in effect, Polk was
justly censured.86
The Eagleton, Stennis and Bentsen proposals were based on the view
that presidential power to move the Armed Forces of the United States
did not, and should not, extend to placing American men in situations
where combat is almost inevitable. Further, as Vietnam has illustrated,
these three proposals recognize that military advisors to countries where
84. S.J. Res. 59, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1971); S.J. Res. 95, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.
3 (1971); S. 1880, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. S4 (1971).
85. S.J. Res. 59, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971). See also S.J. Res. 95, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1971); S. 1880, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971).
86. CONG. GLoBE, 30th Cong., Ist Sem. 95 1848).
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combat activities are in progress or could be expected to commence shortly
are becoming increasingly more dangerous in an era of "brush-fire" wars
and guerrilla warfare.
VII. CONCLUSION
During 1971, war powers legislation moved forward. Hearings began
on March 8, 1971 and continued until October 6, 1971. Twenty-four wit-
nesses were heard: constitutional historians and lawyers, spokesmen for the
executive and legislative branches and former administration officials.82
After the initial round of hearings, Senator Javits and I, in an effort
to put forth the best proposal and gain the most congressional support,
began to work on a compromise proposal. After months of talking, an
understanding on a compromise bill was reached. Senator Stennis, a leading
Southern conservative, was kept abreast of developments, and on Decem-
ber 6th-one day before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was to
meet in executive session to report a war powers bill to the Senate-he
agreed to co-sponsor the Javits-Eagleton compromise, along with Senator
Spong of Virginia.
With only minor, changes, the Committee reported out the Javits-
Eagleton-Stennis-Spong compromise, a bill which Senator Bentsen of Texas
also co-sponsored.
Specifically, regarding treaties, pre-emptive strike, and necessity for
prior congressional approval for unilateral presidential action, the Javits-
Eagleton-Stennis-Spong bill states:
87. The following is a list of witnesses that appeared before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee's hearings on war powers:
March 8, 1971 Henry Steele Commager
March 9, 1971 Richard Morris
Alfred Kelley
March 24, 1971 Thomas Eagleton
Claiborne Pell
Jacob Javits




April 23, 1971 Barry Goldwater
Frank Horton
April 26, 1971 McGeorge Bundy
George Reedy
John N. Moore
May 14, 1971 William P. Rogers
July 26, 1971 Alexander Bickel
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Treaties:
[A]uthority to introduce the Armed Forces of the United States in
hostilities or in any such situation (where imminent involvement
in hostilities is dearly indicated by the circumstances) shall not
be inferred . . . from any treaty hereafter ratified unless such
treaty is implemented by legislation specifically exempting the in-
troduction of... such Armed Forces from compliance with the pro-
visions of this Act. . . No treaty in force at the time of the
enactment of this Act shall be construed as specific statutory
authorization for or a specific exemption permitting, the intro-
duction of the Armed Forces of the United States in hostilities or
in any such situation....
Pre-emptive strike:
In the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress, the Armed
Forces of the United States may be introduced in hostilities, or in
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is dearly
indicated by the circumstances, only-
(1) to repel an armed attack upon the United States, its terri-
tories and possessions; to take necessary and appropriate retalitory
actions in the event of such an attack; and to forestall the direct
and imminent threat of such an attack; ....
Necessity of prior congressional approval:
Specific statutory authorization is required for the assignment of
members of the Armed Forces of the United States to command,
coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the
regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or gov-
ernment when such Armed Forces are engaged, or there exists an
imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostili-
ties.88
This bill will be debated on the floor sometime during the life of the
second session of the 92nd Congress. Passage of a strong war powers bill is
important in practical terms because it will provide political guidelines by
which future Congresses can decide how and when to go to war. Congress
will be assured of being involved, as the Constitution mandates, in the
life and death decisions which face a democracy on the brink of war. Just
as importantly, such legislation would provide the "judicially discoverable
and manageable standards," which many courts have been unable to dis-
cover or manage with regard to the legality and constitutionality of the
Vietnam War.
A war powers bill will not serve as an absolute guarantee against the
occurrence of non-authorized hostilities in the future. The Indochina War
might have occurred even if the guidelines for war powers responsibility
88. S. 2976, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (emphasis added). For the text of thisbill in its entirety, see APPENDIX No. 2.
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had been dearly defined. Any legislation can be violated by a Chief Execu-
tive who chooses to do so, regardless of how clear and precise its terms.
In addition, no resolution can force Congress to act responsibly. It
is dear that presidential decisions shaped the course of the Indochina war
and that an indifferent Congress provided little or no restraint on executive
actions. Some politicians will continue to prefer unclear guidelines, es-
pecially in an area as crucial as deciding whether to send American sons to
war; for scapegoats are often popular in politics and the assumption of
responsibility often is not.
These are problems that exist with many of the institutional devices
we have developed in an effort to make the government operate in an
orderly fashion. Good faith cannot be legislated. But clear criteria can be
set forth within which men of good faith can and will operate.8 9
89. As one of the first members of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Iredell,
noted:
All systems of government suppose they are to be administered by men
of common sense and common honesty. In our country, as all ultimately
depends on the voice of the people, they have it in their power, and it is to
be presumed they generally will choose men of this description: but if
they will not, the case to be sure, is without remedy. If they choose fools,
they will have foolish laws. If they choose knaves, they will have knavish
ones.
Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 836 (No. 5126) (C.C.D. Pa. 1799).
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APPENDIX No. 1
SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION No. 59
92d Congress, 2d Session
JOINT RESOLUTION
Regarding the powers of the Congress and the President to commit the Armed
Forces of the United States to hostilities.
Whereas the framers of the Constitution of the United States intended the separa-
tion of powers doctrine to apply to the initiation of hostilities as a means for in-
suring collective judgment, whenever possible, before the Armed Forces of the
United States were committed to such hostilities; and
Whereas the power to declare war was assigned to the Congress and this power
authorizes the Congress to initiate, define, and limit the scope of hostilities
involving the Armed Forces of the United States; and
Whereas the power to make rules regulating and governing the Armed Forces of
the United States was assigned to the Congress, and this power authorizes the
Congress to enact laws respecting the raising and use of such Armed Forces in-
cluding their deployment in any foreign country; and
Whereas the power to appropriate moneys to support the Armed Forces of the
United States was also assigned to the Congress, and this power authorizes the
Congress to allocate funds so as to circumscribe the overall scope of hostilities
and the uses of the Armed Forces of the United States; and
Whereas the Commander in Chief and Chief Executive powers were assigned to the
President and these powers authorize the President to conduct hostilities
initiated by the Congress and to respond to, and repel, attacks on the United
States (including its territories and possessions), its Armed Forces, and, under
certain circumstances, to rescue endangered citizens of the United States located
in foreign countries: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America, in Congress assembled, That:
SECTION 1. Except as authorized in section 2 or section 3 of this resolution, the
President shall not commit the Armed Forces of the United States to hostilities. No
treaty previously or hereafter entered into by the United States shall be construed
as authorizing or requiring the Armed Forces of the United States to engage in
hostilities without further Congressional authorization. It is specifically recognized
that such treaties as the Charter of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty,
and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty do not authorize or require the
President to commit the Armed Forces of the United States to engage in hostilities
without a further authorization from both the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives.
SEc. 2. The President may commit the Armed Forces of the United States to
hostilities to the extent authorized by Congress through a declaration of war,
statute, or joint resolution, but authorization to commit the Armed Forces of the
United States to hostilities may not be inferred from legislaive enactments, includ-
ing appropriation bills, which do not specifically include such authorization. The
Congress recognizes that during such authorized hostilities against an enemy
country or enemy forces, the President's powers as Commander in Chief and
Chief Executive provide him with the further authority, regardless of the- limita-
tions contained in the specific declaration of war or other authorizing statute or
resolution, to order the Armed Forces of the United States to deliberately enter,
invade, or intrude upon the territory or airspace of a country with which die United
States is not then engaged in hostilities:
(a) when in hot pursuit of fleeing enemy forces who have attacked, or
engaged in battle with, the Armed Forces of the United States and then re-
treated to the territory or airspace of such country, to the extent necessary
to repel such attack or complete such battle, or
(b) when a clear and present danger exists of an imminent attack on the
[Vol. 37
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United States or the Armed Forces of the United States by enemy troops
located in such country, to the extent necessary to eliminate such danger.
SEc. 3. In the absence of a governing congressional authorization described in
section 2, the President may commit the Armed Forces of the United States to
hostilities, to the extent reasonably necessary to:
(a) repel an attack on the United States by military forces with whom the
United States is not engaged in hostilities at the time of such attack and to
eliminate or reduce the effectiveness of any future attacks by such military
forces which are committing the attack being repelled; and
(b) repel an attack on the Armed Forces of the United States by military
forces with whom the United States is not engaged in hostilities at the time
of such attack and concurrently to eliminate or reduce any clear and present
danger of future attacks by the military forces which are committing the at-
tack being repelled; and
(c) withdraw citizens of the United States, as rapidly as possible, from
any country in which such citizens, there due to their own volition and with
the express or tacit consent of the government of such country, are being sub-
jected to an imminent threat to their lives, either sponsored by such govern-
ment or beyond the power of such government to control: Provided, That
the President shall make every effort to terminate such a threat without using
the Armed Forces of the United States: And provided further, That the Presi-
dent shall, where possible, obtain the consent of the government of such
country before using the Armed Forces of the United States.
SEc. 4. The commitment of the Armed Forces of the United States to hostilities
pursuant to section 8 of this resolution shall be reported promptly by the President
to the Congress, together with a full account of the circumstances under which
such hostilities were initiated, the estimated scope of such hostilities, and the con-
sistency of such hostilities, with the provisions of section 8. The question of con-
tinuing or terminating any such hostilities shall be decided upon by the Congress as
soon as possible and not more than thirty days from the day on which hostilities
were initiated, under the following procedures:
(a) any bill or resolution, authorizing the continuance or termination
of military hostilities if sponsored or cosponsored by one-third of the Members
of the House of Congress in which it originates, shall be considered reported
to the floor of such House no later than one day following its introduction,
unless the Members of such House otherwise determine by yeas and nays; and
any such bill or resolution referred to a committee after having passed one
House of Congress shall be considered reported from such committee within
three days after it is referred to such committee, unless the Members of the
House referring it to committee shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays;
and
(b) any bill or resolution reported pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section shall itmediately become the pending business of the House to which
it is reported, and shall be voted upon within three days after such report,
unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
SEc. 5. In any case where the Armed Forces of the United States have been
committed to authorized hostilities, the President shall, while such hostilities are in
progress, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities, as well
as on the estimated scope and length of such hostilities.
SEc. 6. For purposes of this resolution, the term "hostilities" includes land,
air, or naval actions taken by the Armed Forces of the United States against other
armed forces or the civilian population of any other nation, the deployment of the
Armed Forces of the United States outside of the United States under circumstances
where an imminent involvement in combat activities with other armed forces is
a reasonable possibility, or the assignment of members of the Armed Forces of the
United States to accompany, command, coordinate, or participate, in the move-
ment of regular or irregular armed forces of any foreign country when such foreign
armed forces are engaged in any form of combat activities.
SEC. 7. This resolution shall not apply to hostilities commenced before the en-
actment of the resolution.
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APPENDIX No. 2
SFNATE BILL No. 2956
92d Congress, 2d Session
A BILL
To make rules governing the use of the Armed Forces of the United States in the
absence of a declaration of war by the Congress.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "War Powers Act".
PURPOSE AND POLICY
SEc. 2. It is the purpose of this Act to fulfill the intent of the framers of the
Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both
the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of the Armed Forces
of the United States in hostilities, or in situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of
such forces in hostilities or in such situations after they have been introduced in
hostilities or in such situations. Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is
specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws neces-
sary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all
other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any department or officer thereof. At the same time, this Act is not intended
to encroach upon the recognized powers of the President, as Commander in Chief
and Chief Executive, to conduct hostilities authorized by the Congress, to respond
to attacks or the imminent threat of attacks upon the United States, -including its
territories and possessions, to repel attacks or forestall the imminent threat of at-
tacks against the Armed Forces of the United States, and, under proper circum-
stances, to rescue endangered citizens and nationals of the United States located
in foreign countries.
EMERGENCY USE OF THE ARMED FORCES
SEc. 3. In the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress, the Armed Forces
of the United States may be introduced in hostilities, or in situations where im-
minent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, only-
(1) to repel an armed attack upon the United States, its territories and
possessions; to take necessary and appropriate retaliatory actions in the event
of such an attack; and to forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an
attack;
(2) to repel an armed attack against the Armed Forces of the United
States located outside of the United States, its territories and possessions, and
to forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an attack;
(3) to protect while evacuating citizens and nationals of the United
States, as rapidly as possible, from any country in which such citizens and
nationals are present with the express or tacit consent of the government
of such country and are being subjected to a direct and imminent threat to
their lives, either sponsored by such government or beyond the power of such
government to control; but the President shall make every effort to terminate
such a threat without using the Armed Forces of the United States, and shall,
where possible, obtain the consent of the government of such country before
using the Armed Forces of the United States to protect citizens and nationals
of the United States being evacuated from such country; or
(4) pursuant to specific statutory authorization, but authority to intro-
duce the Armed Forces of the United States in hostilities or in any such situa-
ation shall not be inferred (A) from any provision of law hereafter, enacted,
including any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such pro-
vision specifically authorizes the introduction of such Armed Forcesin. hostili-
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ties or in such situation and specifically exempts the introduction of such
Armed Forces from compliance with the provisions of this Act, or (B) from
any treaty hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation
specifically authorizing the introduction of the Armed Forces of the United
States in hostilities or in such situation and specifically exempting the intro-
duction of such Armed Forces from compliance with the provisions of this Act.
Specific statutory authorization is required for the assignment of members of
the Armed Forces of the United States to command, coordinate, participate in
the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military, forces of
any foreign country or government when such Armed Forces are engaged, or
there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in
hostilities. No treaty in force at the time of the enactment of this Act shall
be construed as specific statutory authorization for, or a specific exemption
permitting, the introduction of the Armed Forces of the United States in
hostilities or in any such situation, within the meaning of this clause (4); and
no provision of law in force at the time of the enactment of this Act shall be
so construed unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of
such Armed Forces in hostilities or in any such situation.
REPORTS
SEC. 4. The introduction of the Armed Forces of the United States in hostilities,
or in any situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances, under any of the conditions described in section 3 of this
Act shall be reported promptly in writing by the President to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, together with a full
account of the circumstances under which such Armed Forces were introduced in
such hostilities or in such situation, the estimated scope of such hostilities or situa-
tion, and the consistency of the introduction of such forces in such hostilities or
situation with the provisions of section 3 of this Act. Whenever Armed Forces of
the United States are engaged in hostilities or in any such situation outside of the
United States, its territories and possessions, the President shall, so long as such
Armed Forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or in such situation, report
to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well
as the scope and expected duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event
shall he report to the Congress less often than every six months.
THIRTY-DAY AUTHORIZATION PERIOD
SEc. 5. The use of the Armed Forces of the United States in hostilities, or in
any situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances, under any of the conditions described in section 3 of this Act shall
not be sustained beyond thirty days from the date of the introduction of such
Armed Forces in hostilities or in any such situation unless the continued use there-
of in such hostilities or in such situation has been authorized in specific legislation
enacted for that purpose by the Congress and pursuant to the provisions thereof.
TERMINATION WITHIN THIRTY-DAY PERIOD
SEc. 6. The use of the Armed Forces of the United States in hostilities, or in
any situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances, under any of the conditions described in section 3 of this Act may
be terminated prior to the thirty-day period specified in section 5 of this Act by an
Act or joint resolution of Congress.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROVISIONS
SEC. 7. (a) Any bill or joint resolution authorizing a continuation of the use
of the Armed Forces of the United States in hostilities, or in any situation where im-
minent involvement in hostilities is dearly indicated by the circumstances, under
any of the conditions described in section 3 of this Act, or any bill or joint resolu-
tion terminating the use of Armed Forces of the United States in hostilities, as
provided in section 6 of this Act, shall, if sponsored or co-sponsored by one-third
of the Members of the House of Congress in which it is introduced, be considered
reported to the floor of such House no later than one day following its introduc-
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tion unless the Members of such House otherwise determine by yeas and nays. Any
such bill or joint resolution, after having been passed by the House of Congress
in which it originated, shall be considered reported to the floor of the other
House of Congress within one day after it has been passed by the House in which
it originated and sent to the other House, unless the Members of the other House
shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(b) Any bill or joint resolution reported to the floor pursuant to subsection
(a) or when placed directly on the calendar shall immediately become the pending
business of the House in which such bill or joint resolution is reported or placed
directly on the calendar, and shall be voted upon within three days after it has
been reported or placed directly on the calendar, as the case may be, unless such
House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
SEC. 8. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person
or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of
such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.
EFFECTIVE DATE AND APPLICABILITY
Sc. 9. This Act shall take effect on the date of its enactment but shall not
apply to hostilities in which the Armed Forces of the United States are involved
on the effective date of this Act.
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